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INTRODUCTION
My interest in diversification of the federal judiciary grew out of my
research in employment discrimination law. During the course of this
research, it became clear to me that many federal judges did not seem to
understand the position of the plaintiffs. For example, the judges were
looking at fact patterns that I thought would have qualified as an
instance of sexual harassment. Yet, they were granting summary
judgment on the ground that no reasonable person would find that such
behaviors met the legal standard for sexual harassment. I began to
wonder who these judges were and why they failed to understand the
working situation of many of these employment discrimination
plaintiffs. The effort to find out who these judges were led me to the
work of political scientists, who had been studying the demographics of
the federal judiciary and the effects of judicial background factors on the
voting behaviors of judges for some time. I also looked closely at the
work of gender and racial bias task forces and these organizations'
reports. The work of these academics and legal groups was both
interesting and, at times, startling to one who admittedly and naively
had liked to think that law involved a set of neutral principles applied
similarly by all judges.
Legal scholars have long lauded diversity on the bench as a necessary
and beneficial aspect of a just judicial system, although they have had
varying theories on why diversity is beneficial.1 The difficulty in
expressing the benefits of diversity stems in part from the tension that
arises in arguments asserting that a more diverse judiciary might lead to
different case outcomes. After all, if all judges should theoretically apply
neutral principles alike, then admitting that there is a difference in how
judges vote based on background factors such as their race and gender
undermines the entire myth (or, perhaps, goal) of a neutral and impartial
judiciary.2 Indeed, the ABA's Model Code of Judicial Conduct requires
' See, e.g., Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public
Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 424 (2000); Kevin R. Johnson, On the Appointment of
a Latinalo to the Supreme Court, 5 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (2002) (discussing potential
benefits of appointment of a Latina/o Supreme Court Justice).
2 See Kimberly A. Lonsway, et al., Understanding the Judicial Role in Addressing Gender
Bias: A View from the Eighth Circuit Federal Court System, 27 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 205, 206
(2002) ("The classical view of judges is that they are disengaged and dispassionate
adjudicators with little interest or involvement in the proceedings before them."); Michael
E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley, Rethinking Feminist Judging, 70 IND. L.J. 891, 909 (1995)
(arguing that appointing female judges to advance a feminist agenda "clashes with the
long-standing goal of impartial judging"). But see L. Scott Smith, Law, Morality and Judicial
Decision-Making, 65 TEx. B.J. 400, 407-08 (2002) (recounting instances of judges admittedly
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that "[a] judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice.
3
In addition, once it is proven that nontraditional judges decide certain
4cases differently, the status quo - based on a white male norm _ is
challenged. The members of this powerful group will feel uncomfortable
and concerned that these nontraditional judges' will favor someone
else's viewpoint. Certainly, if a person is in a position of power in
society, as many white males traditionally have been in this country,
they will be reluctant to give up that power and not have their
viewpoints enforced by the courts. As I explain below, this discomfort is
reflected by those involved in the federal nominating process who have
delayed, scrutinized, and at times unfairly undermined nontraditional
judicial candidates.
However, because so few women and minority group members
historically have been appointed to the federal courts, the effects that
diversity might have in the outcome of cases has been difficult to
measure by political scientists and others concerned with the impact of
diversity. While it seems reasonable to believe that nontraditional
judges would have a different viewpoint on certain legal issues because
of their differing life experiences, it has been difficult to show
empirically. Indeed, early attempts to show such an empirical
relationship between race and/or gender of judge and case outcomes
6showed little to no relationship.
The ability of political scientists to measure the impact of a diverse
bench changed with the commitments of Presidents Carter and Clinton
to the appointment of a diverse judiciary. President Carter, after one
term in office, appointed record numbers of women and minority judges.
President Clinton, holding two terms in office, had much more of an
opportunity to further diversify the federal judiciary. Both presidents
were true to their commitments and diversified the federal bench
deciding cases based on desired outcome, "hunch", etc.).
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B (1972).
See Ifill, supra note 1, at 424.
The term "nontraditional judge" is used frequently by political scientists to refer to
women and minority group member (such as African American, Asian, and Latina/o)
judges. I will likewise use it in this article to refer to judges who are not white males. In
addition, I occasionally will refer to white males as traditional appointees or judges.
6 See e.g., Sue Davis, President Carter's Selection Reforms and Judicial Policymaking: A
Voting Analysis of the United States Courts of Appeals, 14 AM. POL. Q. 328, 335 (1986)
(examining impact of a judge's race); Elaine Martin, Men and Women on the Bench: Vive La
Difference?, 73 JUDICATURE 204, 208 (1990) (detailing studies of gender of judge prior to
1990); Jennifer A. Segal, The Decision Making of Clinton's Nontraditional Judicial Appointees, 80
JUDICATURE 279 (1997) (noting effects of race or sex are unclear).
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significantly. Carter appointees did not show all that much of a
difference in voting pattern from their traditional counterparts. This
could well have been the result of the smaller sample of judges that
political scientists studied in this pool or because there was a great deal
of commonality in judicial viewpoint in President Carter's traditional
and nontraditional appointees. However, Clinton appointed far greater
numbers of women and minority judges than Carter. After several years
of decision making by Clinton judges, political scientists have begun to
study their decision patterns. These studies reveal the effects of diversity
in some key areas of federal court litigation - in particular, civil rights.
In this essay, I examine three things. First, I briefly describe several
recent empirical studies of decision making patterns of nontraditional
judges. Emphasis is placed on studies of Clinton appointees, because
they form the best and most recent data set and will have the longest
impact on the federal courts until President Bush has the opportunity to
nominate a significant number of judges. Second, I point out ways in
which nontraditional judges might make differences that, although
seemingly intangible in terms of case outcomes, might well have an
effect on them. For example, I review a study that discusses the possible
effects of nontraditional judges' presence on a three judge panel as well
as potential differences in how they might approach a case. Finally, I
address some obstacles nontraditional candidates have met in the Senate
during the confirmation process. I attempt to reconceptualize the role of
the federal judge and show that diversity in the judiciary is necessary for
the fair administration of justice.
I. THE STATISTICS ON DIVERSITY
A. Political Science Theory on Judicial Decision Making
Political science research has focused on what is known as the
"attitudinal model" of judicial decision making.7 Under this model,
judges make decisions based not on the neutral application of precedent,
but instead on "each judge's political ideology and the identity of the
parties."' This theory is consistent with both the Critical Legal Studies as
7 JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrTUDINAL
MODEL 65 (1993).
1 Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251, 265 (1997).
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well as the Legal Realism movements in legal philosophy.9 Thus,
according to some studies, whether someone is a Democrat or
Republican or appointed by a Democratic or Republican president
predicts that judge's political philosophy and how he or she will decide a
particular case. Extending this analysis to race and gender, it is thought
that if a judge's political philosophy is shaped in part by life experiences,
women and members of minority groups would have different political
philosophies because of the impact of gender and race on their lives.'0
While early research on the attitudinal model focused on political
affiliations of judges or of their appointing president, more recent
research has focused on race and gender and the intersection of these
factors. The increase in numbers of women and minority group
members on the bench since both President Carter's and President
Clinton's judicial appointments has made it statistically possible to
assess whether gender and race actually affect case outcomes. For
example, the Clinton administration successfully appointed fifty-one
women and forty-two judges of color, for a total of 29% and 24%,
respectively, of its 174 appointments." Nevertheless, the majority of
sitting judges remain white males, many of whom were appointed by
Republican presidents.
As for the influence of the judge's gender, initially legal theorists
latched onto Carol Gilligan's theory that women reason differently than
men. Gilligan explained that women have a "different voice," that
resulted in women judging differently than men. 13 Based on the idea
that women engaged in an ethic of care and concern for the community,
Suzanna Sherry and others sought to show how this would affect the
legal reasoning, and in some cases the outcomes, of cases decided by
women. Since Sherry's initial work, this approach has been criticized -
Id. at 267.
,o See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 7, at 64-73.
Carl Tobias, Judicial Selection at the Clinton Administration's End, 19 LAw & INEQ. 159,
181 (2001).
12 Sheldon Goldman, et al., Make-Up of the Federal Bench, 84 JUDICATURE 253, 253 (2001).
While there was a slight Democratic majority as of January 1, 2001, in the federal district
courts, this bare majority will be short-lived as President George W. Bush has fifty-seven
vacancies to fill. Id. With President Bush's appointments to the Courts of Appeal,
Republican appointed circuit court judges will have a "solid majority." Id.
" CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: WOMEN'S CONCEPTION OF
SELF AND OF MORALITY (1977); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986); Carol E. Garner, Judges'Gendered
Voices: An Empirical Study of Decision Making by the Women of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, Case Western Reserve U. School of Law (1994).
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sometimes by the subject of the work itself (in one case, Justice O'Connor
disagreed with Sherry's assessment of her judging). While some female
judges have embraced the notion that they judge differently,1 5 others
have fought it.
16
The opinion of female judges aside, proof of the validity (or invalidity)
of Gilligan's different voice theory might be found in the studies of
political scientists. While some have criticized her findings based on the
design of her study,17 her theory no doubt continues to be taught,
discussed, and tested because something about it rings true, or at least
true based on some stereotyped notion of the way in which women
behave. The difference in men's and women's decision making
processes, one way or another, might emerge in the outcomes of actual
cases. Enough women judges have finally been appointed so that
political scientists can study voting behaviors and determine whether
women vote differently than their male counterparts in certain types of
cases. Many of these studies have focused on what are termed
"women's cases," or cases in which it is thought that women and men
might have a different perspective. Such studies have looked at, for
example, employment discrimination cases, including sex and race
discrimination," criminal cases,'9 family law cases,20 and abortion rights21
cases. Similarly, studies have sought to show differences based on race
"4 See Jilda M. Aliotta, Justice O'Connor and the Equal Protection Clause: A Feminine
Voice?, 78 JUDICATURE 232 (1995); Sandra Day O'Connor, Portia's Progress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1546, 1553-54 (1991).
15 See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Woman Has Robes: Four Questions, 14 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 489, 492-96 (1984); Christine Durham, President's Column, 8 NAWJ NEWS
AND ANNOUNCEMENTS 1, 3 (1987); Marion Zenn Goldberg, Carter-Appointed Judges:
Perspectives on Gender, 26 TRIAL 108 (April 1990) (quoting Judge Judith S. Kaye).
16 See Solimine & Wheatley, supra note 2, at 905 n.111 (citing articles in which women
judges stated that they did not judge differently than men).
"7 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 871 n.174
(1990) (citing criticism of Gilligan's work); see also Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in
Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1301-02 (discussing and citing feminist criticism
of Gilligan's work).
" See e.g., Garner, supra note 13, at 25 & tbl. 3; Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges' Sex
and Race on Judicial Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1981-1996, dissertation,
Dept. of Political Science, University of Chicago (1999).
19 See e.g., Garner, supra note 13; Donald R. Songer & Kelley A. Crews-Meyer, Does
Judge Gender Matter? Decision Making in State Supreme Courts, 81 Soc. Sc. Q. 750 (2000);
Darrell Steffensmeier & Chris Hebert, Women and Men Policymakers: Does the Judge's Gender
Affect the Sentencing of Criminal Defendants?, 77 SoC. FORCES 1163 (1999).
o See e.g., Phyllis Coontz, Gender and Judicial Decisions: Do Female Judges Decide Cases
Differently Than Male Judges?, 18 GENDER ISSUES 59, 67-72 (Fall 2000).
21 See e.g., Garner, supra note 13.
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in, for example, sex and race discrimination cases, criminal cases,5 and
family law cases.24
B. How Judges Vote Based on Gender, Race, and Political Affiliation
Because this symposium focuses on federal judicial selection in the
twenty-first century, I will focus on recent studies that have evaluated
voting patterns of federal district and circuit court judges based on race
and gender with an eye toward the implications of these studies on
future judicial selection.
The first study is by political scientist Nancy Crowe. Professor Crowe
examined race and sex discrimination cases decided by the United States
Courts of Appeals between 1981 and 1996.25 Her study focused on non-
consensual cases, i.e., cases in which there was not unanimity in the
result among the particular panel members involved. 26  Others have
criticized the focus of political scientists on non-unanimous cases,27 but
these cases seem a natural focus of study. In the typical case in which
there is unanimity and, therefore, little room for disagreement among
the judges, one would not expect judicial ideology to play such a
significant role in the outcome. Ideological factors are more likely to find
expression in cases in which there is room for disagreement about the
outcome. Certainly, employment discrimination cases involving sex and
race likely would be the types of cases in which the race or gender of the
judge would have an impact.
Professor Crowe's extensive study examined the effects that race,
gender, and political party have in sex discrimination case outcomes.
These factors were found to have the expected effects in several
instances: women and African American judges were more likely to vote
See, e.g., Crowe, supra note 18.
See, e.g., Linda A. Foley, et al., The Effect of Race on Decisions by Judges and Other
Officers of the Court, 26 J. APP. ScIC. PSYCH. 1190 (1996); Jon Gottschall, Carter's Judicial
Appointments: the Influence of Affirmative Action and Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 67 JUDICATURE 164 (1983); Darrell Steffensmeier & Chester L. Britt, Judges'
Race and Judicial Decision Making: Do Black Judges Sentence Differently?, 82 Soc. Sc1. Q. 749
(2001) (presenting results of study attempting to assess differences in incarceration and
sentencing decisions).
24 See, e.g. Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, Gender, Race and Partisanship on the Michigan
Supreme Court, 63 ALB. L. REv. 1205, 1222-36 (2000) (explaining study of effects of race and
gender of judge on discrimination, divorce and cases involving feminist issues).
z Crowe, supra note 18.
26 Id. at 56.
See e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial
Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 260 (1990).
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for a sex discrimination plaintiff than their white male counterparts2
The effects of partisanship were strong and larger for men than for
women. Thus, while a white male Republican judge voted for the
plaintiff only 28% of the time, a white male Democratic judge voted for
the plaintiff 76% of the time. There was a similar effect, although not as
large, for political party affiliation for both African American men and
white females. Republican females voted for the plaintiff 53% of the
time, while their Democratic counterparts voted for the plaintiff 90% of
the time. Additionally, African American Republican judges voted for
the plaintiff 61% of the time, whereas their Democratic counterparts
voted for the plaintiff 93% of the time.3 Interestingly, African American
Democratic judges were slightly more sympathetic to sex discrimination
plaintiffs than white Democratic female judges. The results of Professor
Crowe's study are summarized in Table I below.
Table 1: Chance of a vote for a sex discrimination plaintiff based on
race, gender and political affiliation.3'
White Male Judge White Female Judge Black Male Judge
Republican 28% 53% 61%
Democrat 76% 90% 93%
This same pattern, however, did not emerge in the race discrimination
cases studied. In those cases there was not a statistically significant
difference in the voting patterns of white male judges and white female
judges, although there was a difference based on political party
affiliation. White male Democratic judges voted for race discrimination
plaintiffs 49% of the time, whereas white female Democratic judges
voted for the plaintiffs in these cases 51% of the time. There was,
likewise, no statistically significant difference between white male
Republican judges and their white female counterparts, who voted for
' Crowe, supra note 18, at 80.
Id. at 83, fig. 3.1.
' Id. Another study assessed plaintiff win rates in sexual harassment cases in
particular. Ann Juliano and Stewart J. Schwab studied the federal judiciary's decision
making in sexual harassment cases from 1986 to 1996. Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab,
The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 575 tbl. 4 (2001). They found
that, overall, plaintiffs win in 45.2% of appeals in sexual harassment cases that result in a
published opinion. The win rate for plaintiffs drops to 39% when other unpublished
dispositions are added. See id.
3' Crowe, supra note 18, at 83 fig. 3.1.
Id. at 114 fig. 4.1.
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race discrimination plaintiffs 20% and 21% of the time, respectively.
These statistics reveal an obvious difference based on the political party
affiliation of the judge. In addition, race made a significant difference in
voting patterns. African American male Republican judges voted for
plaintiffs 60% of the time and their Democratic counterparts voted for
33
the plaintiff 85% of the time. Thus, while white women were no more
likely than their white male counterparts of the same party to vote for a
race discrimination plaintiff, African American male judges clearly were
more likely to vote for a race discrimination plaintiff. Indeed, an African
American male Republican judge was more likely to vote for a race
discrimination plaintiff than a white male or female Democratic judge.
Table 2 summarizes these findings.
Table 2: Chance of a vote for a race discrimination plaintiff based on
race, gender and political affiliation.34
White Male Judge White Female Judge Black Male Judge
Republican 20% 21% 60%
Democrat 49% 51% 85%
The implications of these voting patterns are even more telling given
the demographics of the federal judiciary. As of the last year included in
this study, 1996, the chance of drawing an all male panel was 59%. The
chance of drawing a panel with one female was 34%.35 The chance of
drawing a panel with two women was 6%. In the case of race, the
chance of drawing an all white panel as of 1996 was 80%.1 The chance of
drawing one African American judge was 19%, and the chance of two
African American judges sitting on a panel was 1%.37 While the chance
of drawing a panel with a nontraditional judge, would be somewhat
higher today due to Clinton's later appointments, these numbers show a
steep hill that an employment discrimination plaintiff must climb. This




Id. at 94 fig. 3.2.
6 Crowe, supra note 18, at 123 fig. 4.2.
37 Id.
' See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 30.
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What is perhaps more startling are Crowe's findings about the effects
of composition of the particular panel. It has been thought that a
nontraditional panel member would help bring a different perspective to
such cases. 9 Instead, there was either no effect on outcome or a negative
effect. First, having a female on the panel had no statistically significant
impact on voting behavior of male judges in employment discrimination
cases. However, having an African American judge on a panel had a
negative impact on the decision making behavior of white male judges in
race discrimination cases.40 A panel composed entirely of white males
was more likely to rule for a race discrimination plaintiff than a panel
that included one African American judge.4 1 For white male Republican
judges, the figure dropped from 27% to 14%, whereas for white male
Democratic judges it dropped from 62% to 42% in favor of the plaintiff.
This is the inverse of what was expected. The presence of an African
American judge was thought to make the panel more likely to rule for a
race discrimination plaintiff. Crowe opined that this finding may be the
result of white male judges somehow compensating for the presence of
an African American judge on the panel. 2 It is interesting that the same
pattern does not emerge for sex cases based on the presence of a female
judge. While Crowe theorizes that this may not happen in the context of
gender because white male judges are used to seeing more variety in the
ideology of female judges, I suspect that white male judges might find
race more salient than gender and not be as concerned with the potential
power of female judges as they are with the power of African American
male judges. Whatever the reasons for this result, it is disturbing.
Professor Crowe's findings are consistent with the findings of Haire,
Humphries, and Songer, who studied published decisions of the United
States Courts of Appeals judges from 1993 to 1999.43 They studied 12,275
For example, it is well known that Thurgood Marshall brought a different and
valued perspective to the Supreme Court's deliberations. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 3-7;
Anthony M. Kennedy, The Voice of Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1221 (1992); Sandra
Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1217 (1992).
4 It should be noted that other studies have shown the opposite effect based on having
a woman as a member of the particular court. In particular, Gryski, Main, and Dixon
found in a study of state supreme courts that the presence of a female colleague had an
impact on outcomes in gender discrimination cases. See Songer & Crews-Meyer, supra note
19, at 755-57 (providing results of their own study as well as citing and discussing Gryski,
Main and Dixon). The liberal outcome (i.e., in favor of the plaintiff) was more likely if there
was a female member on the court. Id.
" Crowe, supra note 18, at 156 fig. 5.2.
Id. at 157.
' Susan B. Haire, Martha Ann Humphries & Donald R. Songer, The Voting Behavior of
Clinton's Courts of Appeals Appointees, 84 JUDICATURE 274 (2001).
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votes44 in three areas: civil rights, criminal law, and labor/economic
cases. In the civil rights area in particular, they found that "Clinton
appointees offered substantially more support to the liberal position." *s
The same did not hold true for criminal and economic cases, in which
Clinton appointees voted more akin to judges appointed by moderate
Republican presidents (i.e., Nixon and Ford). The effects of partisanship
differences became greater when non-consensual and non-unanimous
cases were studied. In addition, the researchers did not find a
statistically significant difference between voting behaviors of Clinton's
traditional and nontraditional judges. However, the researchers believe
such a difference might emerge in criminal and labor/economic cases
once more votes are available for study.46 Interestingly, non-unanimous
cases represented only approximately 10% of the total number of cases
studied.47 Thus, much of the time, all panel members agreed on the
outcome.
Professor Jennifer Segal likewise did a study assessing the effects of
race and gender of judges, but her study focused on the federal district
courts. Unlike Crowe, she set up pairs of Clinton appointees to see if
there were differences in voting behavior based on race and/or gender.4
Using cases published in the Federal Supplement, she ultimately studied
799 cases for the gender pairs and 701 cases for the race pairs.4 9 Unlike
Crowe, her pairs were designed to avoid the effects of political
affiliation. Segal studied cases in which she expected a difference based
on race or gender of the judge. In the case of impact based on gender,
she studied "women's issues," including cases of "gender
discrimination, sexual harassment, abortion rights and maternity rights,
custody battles, and equal pay."5° The cases studied for race included
what she termed "black issues," including cases based on "race
discrimination, voting rights, school desegregation, and affirmative
" The term "vote" is used here because the authors of the study counted each
individual judge's vote in a particular case included in the study. Thus, the terms "ruling"
or "decision" are not precisely appropriate in this context. Instead, the measure is whether
the particular judge voted for the liberal position on the issue being studied.
Haire, et al., supra note 43, at 278.
Id. at 279 tbl. 4 & 280.
" Id. at 279. But see Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American
Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 237 (1999) (noting that non-unanimous
decisions are usually less than 30% of high court activity).
Jennifer A. Segal, Representative Decision Making on the Federal Bench: Clinton's
District Court Appointees, 53 POL. RES. Q. 137,142 (2000).
19 Id. at 143.
so Id.
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action."' In addition, other minority related issues," personal liberty
cases,53 criminal rights cases,4 and federal economic regulation cases
were used in both the race and gender analyses. 6
Professor Segal found little difference in voting behaviors based on
race or sex between Clinton appointees; and where such differences
existed, they were unexpected. She found no statistically significant
difference between African American and white Clinton district court
appointees, except with respect to personal liberties claims, where
African American appointees were less likely to support the liberty
claim.57 She found no statistically significant differences based on gender
except for cases on women's issues, wherein men were more supportive
58of the women's position than women. More problematic might be the
overall lack of support for both women's and minority issues by all these
Clinton appointees. This lends some credence to the assessment (and the
occasional complaint) that Clinton's appointees were much more
moderate than liberal. 9 Or, perhaps, President Clinton's appointees
were philosophically similar regardless of the background factors of race
and gender.
Professor Segal poses several different theories for these results. One
explanation she suggests is that the attitudinal model - the political
affiliation of these judges - explains the lack of differences in these
results. Another theory is based on the lack of homogeneity of
viewpoint in the African American and female communities. The
diversity of viewpoint in these communities makes it difficult for these
51 Id.
52 Specifically, "ethnic, disability, age and poverty discrimination, and alien rights"
cases. Id.
This included "freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights and by state and federal
laws." Segal, supra note 48, at 143
' This included "claims made by alleged criminals, including due process, equal
protection and other civil liberties claims, petitions for writs of habeas corpus, a variety of
Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment claims, and some statutory issues regarding
disclosure rules and rules of evidence." Id.
5' This included "challenges to the government's regulatory policies in banking,
education, tax, and social security benefits issues." Id.
m Id.
" Id. at 144-45 & tbl. 2.
s' Id. at 146 tbl. 3. See also Gamer, supra note 13, at 25 tbl. 3 & 27 (study of Ninth Circuit
found that "Democratic women were not substantially more likely than Democratic men to
vote in favor of a discrimination claim.").
" See Robert A. Carp, Kenneth L. Manning & Ronald Stidham, President Clinton's
District Judges: "Extreme Liberals" or Just Plain Moderates?, 84 JUDICATURE 282 (2001).
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60appointees to represent their constituency substantively in the law.
There is a diversity of viewpoints among women, for example, who
ascribe to feminism. That there should be a diversity of viewpoints
among women who are judges in a country in which Phyllis Shafly,
Camille Paglia, and Andrea Dworkin (although not all these women
would describe themselves as "feminists") all participate in the public
debate about equal rights should not be surprising. Indeed, the feminist
movement learned of the diversity of viewpoints among women early
on. It was thought among early feminists that once women received the
right to vote, the condition of women in this country would improve
greatly. They were surprised when they found that many women voted
as conservatively on issues affecting women as their husbands did.62
Segal's results are consistent with those of Carp, Manning, and
Stidham, who similarly focused on the voting patterns of President
Clinton's district court appointees 3 Their findings also compared the
voting records of Clinton's appointees to his six predecessors. In
addition to reporting findings similar to those of Segal, they offer an
interesting comparison to other presidents' judicial appointees. They
focused on three categories of cases: (1) criminal; (2) civil rights and
liberties; and (3) labor and economic relations. The data they used also
came from trial cases published in the Federal Supplement. They found
that, overall, Clinton's traditional appointees were more liberal than his
nontraditional appointees. Traditional appointees voted liberally 46% of
the time, whereas nontraditional appointees judges voted liberally 42%
of the time. 4 This gap widened for civil rights and liberties cases to 9%,
with traditional appointees voting more liberally than their
nontraditional counterpartsi 5 A similar 6% gap existed for labor and
economic regulation cases. However, the tendency was reversed in
criminal justice cases, in which nontraditional appointees voted liberally
37% of the time and traditional appointees voted liberally 32% of the
time.66
6 Segal, supra note 48, at 147.
61 See Ann C. Dailey, Feminism's Return to Liberalism, 102 YALE L. J. 1265 (1993)
(discussing differing theories among legal feminists).
62 WILLIAM H. CHAFE, THE PARADOX OF CHANGE: AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE 20TH
CENTURY 32 (1991).
' See Carp, et al., supra note 59, at 282.
Id. at 286 & tbl. 3.
Id. at 286.
6 Id.
University of California, Davis
In addition, President Clinton's appointees were moderate compared
to the appointees of his Democratic predecessor, Jimmy Carter. The
voting records of Clinton's district court appointees are in between the
more conservative voting records of Bush and Reagan appointees and
the more liberal voting records of Carter and Johnson. 7 For example,
overall, Clinton appointees voted for the liberal position 44% of the time.
Carter and Johnson appointees voted for the liberal position 52% of the
time, whereas Reagan and Bush appointees voted for the liberal position
26% and 29% of the time, respectively. Similar to Clinton's appointees,
Ford's appointees voted for the liberal position 43% of the timei6 The
61studies done on civil rights and civil liberties cases have similar results.
While these studies appear to make a compelling case for the effects of
political ideology, they are somewhat equivocal when it comes to gender
and race effects. Indeed, political scientists have noted that the effects of
race and gender of judge are inconclusive. 7 Perhaps as more
nontraditional judges appointed by Clinton get their bearings and have
more of an opportunity to render judgments, effects based on race or
gender will become more palpable. In the meantime, one should not
discount the effects of "intangibles."
II. Ti-fE INTANGIBLES OF A DIVERSE BENCH
Professor Sherrilyn Ifill has argued elsewhere that diversity might well
have more than simply an effect on case outcomes.7 While outcomes
would seem to be of the utmost importance to litigants, they do not tell
the whole story. With well less than 5% of federal cases actually
reaching trial, most cases are disposed of before trial, and in particular
by pre-trial motion practice or settlement.72 Judges obviously play a role
and, in some instances, are responsible for these pre-trial outcomes.
Indeed, the studies discussed above would include these case outcomes
when they resulted in a published decision. It is less obvious how the
perspective of the judge might affect settlement or other aspects of a
lawsuit. Because many of these effects are not statistically measurable,
' Id. at 285 tbls. 1 & 2.
' Carp, et al., supra note 59, at 285 tbl. 1.
See id. at 285 tbl. 2.
70 See, e.g., Coontz, supra note 20, at 61-62 (gender studies "limited and inconclusive");
cite race.
71 See Ifill, supra note 1.
Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, 88 ABA J. 24, 26 (Oct. 2002)(only 2.2% of
federal civil cases were resolved by bench or jury trial in 2001).
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they have not been studied to the same degree as reported outcomes.
Although some have studied judicial reasoning in opinions to find the
elusive feminine "different voice,, 73 I do not know of any study that
examines settlement rates based on whether the judge is a woman or
minority group member. Yet, a judge's race or gender likely affects how
they treat litigants and attorneys in the courtroom. At this point I'd like
to depart from empiricism and provide a few anecdotal examples of the
way in which a judge's gender or race might make a difference in the
courtroom. While I use the term "anecdotal" here, these anecdotes are
fairly representative of the findings of gender and racial bias task forces,
and thus there is more support for this than that term might imply.
74
Several years ago I spoke at a symposium on sexual harassment law.
A female Republican appointed federal judge also was speaking at the
symposium. She and I shared a ride from the airport together and had a
conversation during which I suggested that outcomes of sexual
harassment cases were influenced by the gender of the trial judge. She
agreed that sometimes being a female judge seemed to make a difference
in cases and told me the following story.
A case was before her court brought by a pro se plaintiff. In that case, a
police officer was accused of forcing a woman he pulled over for a traffic
stop to have sex with him in return for not pressing the traffic violation.
The judge told me that she and her female clerks understood the
woman's position, but that the opposing counsel and the woman's own
attorney, who the judge appointed, did not. They apparently saw it as a
simple case of consensual sex. Indeed, the judge said that it was obvious
from the behavior of both the plaintiff's attorney and the defense counsel
that they thought the case was bogus. As this female judge put it, "You
should have seen the lawyers' faces when I found for her and awarded
her damages." She explained that, after hearing the evidence, it was
obvious to her and the women working in her chambers that this officer
had abused his power in order to have sex with this woman.
In a similar vein, I had a conversation with an African American
female state court judge after I made a presentation to a state bar
committee about gender discrimination by the local bar. She told me
that she understood my point and provided me with another example
from her courtroom experience. She explained that it bothered her
' See e.g., Sherry, supra note 13; Gamer, supra note 13, at 28-38.
' See, e.g., Lonsway, et al., supra note 2 (study showing that female judges are more
likely to perceive gender bias and intervene to stop it when asked to by counsel); see infra
note 79 and accompanying text.
University of California, Davis
greatly when attorneys referred to female and African American
witnesses by their first names while referring to white male witnesses as
"Mr." accompanied by his last name. In fact, she was careful always to
correct any attorney appearing before her if he engaged in such
behavior.
Though these stories are anecdotal, they are likewise supported by the
work of gender and racial bias task forces, who have documented similar
and other disparate treatment of women and minority group members in
the court system.75 For example, the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task
Force reported that "[iun sexual harassment or discrimination cases
before a male judge, plaintiffs' lawyers report a minimization of their
clients' trauma and 'an across the board lack of understanding' as to the
female plaintiff's situation and point of view." 76 The female judges of the
Second Circuit, like the state judge described above, "observed parties or
witnesses ignored, interrupted, or not listened to by lawyers, which the
judges attributed to racial or ethnic bias."7 The Task Force noted the
overall discrepancy in observations of bias between white males and
women and minority group members as well.78 Indeed, "a substantial
percentage of all attorneys observed biased conduct based on gender and
race." 79 A recent study of judges in the Eighth Circuit revealed that
See, e.g., Eighth Circuit Gender Fairness Task Force, Preliminary Report at 89, 93
(1997) (recounting differences in treatment between male and female attorneys and
litigations; 28.8% of female attorneys reported being addressed in unprofessional terms,
whereas only 3% of their male counterparts reported such behavior); Second Circuit Task
Force on Gender, Racial, and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, Preliminary Draft at 28-42
(1997) (noting instances of biased conduct, though infrequent, were "especially" reported
by female judges); Third Circuit Task Force on Equal Treatment in the Courts, Report at 28-
29 (1996) (detailing differing perceptions of treatment between male and female attorneys
as well as race based); Andrew Stepnick & James D. Orcutt, Conflicting Testimony: Judges'
and Attorneys' Perceptions of Gender Bias in Legal Settings, 34 SEX ROLES 567, 576 (1996)
(survey of judges and attorneys showed "the vast majority of women professionals have
witnessed biased treatment by male judges and/or attorneys"); Lonsway, et al., supra note
2, at 218-19 (female judges more likely to observe incivility directed at men and women).
76 Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts:
The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force 127 (1993), reprinted in 67 S.
CAL. L. REV. 745 (1993).
'7 Jay C. Carlisle, Synopsis of the Report of the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial
and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, 19 PACE L. REV. 431, 435 (1999); see also Report of the First
Circuit Gender, Race and Ethnic Bias Task Forces, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 173, 271 tbls. 2-32 & 265
tbls. 2-28 (2000).
78 See Carlisle, supra note 77, at 435.
Id. at 436. The statistics on this are compelling. Fifty-four percent of white males,
77% of white females, 79% of minority males, and 80% of minority female attorneys
observed biased treatment of other attorneys based on gender. Fifty-nine percent of white
males, 59% of white females, 78% of minority males, and 85% of minority females
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female judges were more likely to report observing instances of "general
incivility" as well as gender-related incivility than their male
counterparts and more likely to observe such incivility directed at
women.s Finally, "female judges reported having intervened at the
request of counsel more frequently than their male counterparts."
81
These stories and studies, in particular, point out several ways in
which a female or racial minority judge can make a difference not only in
outcome, but also in how a case is treated in court. The judge in the first
example above thought the case important and meritorious enough to
appoint counsel for the plaintiff. Given the difficulties that nonlawyers
have navigating the legal system, the outcome of a pro se plaintiff's case
can be affected by this decision alone. In addition, the judge considered
the case seriously - more seriously than even the plaintiff's own
attorney did - based on her assessment of the attitudes of the lawyers
involved. She considered the relative positions of the parties in reaching
her outcome and brought an understanding to the power imbalance
between the plaintiff and the law enforcement officer defendant that
might not be as accessible to all. My guess is that the plaintiff believed
throughout her case that the judge had taken her and her claim seriously
(even if her own attorney did not).
These examples illustrate the ways in which the gender or race of the
judge might play into other decisions that may affect the legitimacy of
the legal system, while not affecting the ultimate decision of who
prevails. Not only must members of the public have confidence in the
outcome, but they also must have confidence in the administration of
justice. There are many courtroom interactions that could manifest a
sensitivity or understanding for the position of underrepresented groups
in American society. The second story provides yet another example of
something that cannot be found in any statistical analysis of outcomes;
yet the judge's behavior sends a message to those involved in a
particular case. All people, regardless of race or gender, must be treated
with respect and taken seriously in the legal system. This is something
that both women and minority judges must understand better and may
affect not only how justice is meted out but also how justice is perceived.
And, let us not ignore the counter-examples - situations in which a
judge showed bias against a litigant because of his or her race or gender.
For example, in Catchpole v. Brannon, the trial judge made his gender bias
observed biased treatment of other attorneys based on race or ethnicity.
Lonsway, et al., supra note 2, at 218-19.
Id. at 216.
University of California, Davis
so obvious on the record that the California Court of Appeal reversed the
trial judge's decision in favor of the defendants based on the appearance
82of gender bias. In that California state court case, the plaintiff, an
eighteen year old college student, alleged sexual harassment as well as
related tortious conduct by her supervisor at a Burger King restaurant.
The trial judge himself questioned the sexual harassment victim
extensively about why she brought the lawsuit and whether she
understood the implications of her allegations to the harasser and other
defendants, even going so far as to ask her whether she brought the
lawsuit "to prove something" to her father." Further, the judge evinced
impatience toward her claim, concluding that her testimony (which was
at least in part corroborated) lacked credibility. As the Court of Appeal
concluded, "[t]he courts' remarks throughout trial show that its
conception of the circumstances that may constitute sexual harassment
were based on stereotyped thinking about the nature and roles of
women and myths and misconceptions about the economic and social
realities of women's lives." Another example is provided by Judge
Posner's tortured analysis of the terms "sick bitch" and "bitch" directed
at a woman worker as somehow not being a "gendered" term because
the plaintiff had once been in a relationship with her harasser.
6
Diversity will lead to a richer debate in decision making because of
differing perspectives based on race and gender. For example, Supreme
Court Justice Thurgood Marshall often brought a different perspective to
that Court. As Professor Ifill has noted, he provided a "counter-
narrative" in the deliberative process. 6 This diversity may not be based
only on color, but also based on socio-economic status. As she explains:
Ironically, because African American judges, like most middle-class
African Americans, will tend to be exposed to more varied
experiences across race and class lines than their white counterparts,
they may be better equipped than white judges to draw on and
utilize a range of perspectives and values from communities
throughout the society.8
7
82 Catchpole v. Brannon, 36 Cal. App. 4th 237 (1995).
Id. at 249-51.
88 Id. at 262.
See Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1168-69 (7th
Cir. 1996); see also Robert J. Gregory, You Can Call Me a "Bitch" Just Don't Use the "N-Word":
Some Thoughts on Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations and Rodgers v.
Western-Southern Life Insurance Co., 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 741 (1997).
See Ifill, supra note 1, at 456-57, 483-84 (discussing Marshall's impact).
87 Id. at 469; see also ABRAHAM L. DAVIS, BLACKS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: NEUTRAL
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Professor Ifill criticizes both the role model and public confidence
rationales for diversity, arguing in favor of a more representative model
of a diverse judiciary.8 While Professor Ifill notes that this does not
mean that a white male cannot understand differing perspectives
(indeed, she gives an excellent example of such a case), coming from a
traditionally disenfranchised group certainly makes this perspective
easier to attain.
III. THE TOUGH ROAD TO BECOMING A NONTRADITIONAL FEDERAL JUDGE
The current politicization of the confirmation process has a particular
problematic impact on nontraditional judicial candidates. One way to
get a sense of this is to look at the differences in the process for
confirmation between traditional and nontraditional judicial nominees.
The time differences alone are telling. Nontraditional appointees to the
district courts during the Clinton administration took on average 120
days from nomination to hearings - more than six weeks longer than
white males (for whom it only took seventy-seven days).89 The time
period from nomination to confirmation was likewise longer for
nontraditional versus white male appointees. On average, white males
were confirmed forty-six days more quickly than their nontraditional
counterparts. Nontraditional appointees faired even worse at the Circuit
Court level, where it took nearly two months longer from nomination to
hearing, and 146 days longer from nomination to confirmation for
nontraditional appointees. 90
Further, evidence has begun to come to light that demonstrates that
women and minority group members, even once appointed, may have a
tougher time. Once again, I will begin with an anecdote. While I was a
judicial clerk working for a federal judge sitting in Chicago, I was on an
elevator at lunch time and overheard a rather loud conversation that
occurred between three males. One of the group was maligning
vociferously the late former California Supreme Court Justice Rose Bird.
This person was speaking so ill of Justice Bird that I was quite taken
aback and began to ask myself who this person was. A lawyer? A judge
in the same building as my judge? When one of the younger men who
ARBITERS OR JUDICIAL ACTIvIsTS? at 82-88 (Wyndham Hall Press 1989) (discussing that
African American judges are conscious of their roles).
See Ifill, supra note 1, at 480-81.
Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, Gerard Gryski & Gary Zuk, Clinton's Judges:
Summing up the Legacy, 84 JUDICATURE 228, 234 (2001).
See id. at 235.
University of California, Davis
was with him (who I now assume was his law clerk), called him by the
name Judge _ , I was amazed that a judge would speak so
unprofessionally and publicly about a fellow judge, albeit one sitting on
a different court than him. One can only imagine that nontraditional
judges must experience different treatment from both their colleagues on
the court as well as other participants in the court system, including
attorneys.
Gender bias task forces also show evidence of incivility directed at
female federal judges. In the Eighth Circuit's report, 80% of female
judges returning surveys reported experiencing incivility directed at
them from fellow judges as compared to 32.5% of their male
counterparts.91  As Judith Resnick aptly put it, "the intersection of
women and judge turns out to equal woman a good deal of the time, and
she is other. ,
92
Elaine Martin has documented the difficulties female judges have in
balancing their work and home lives. In a study of Carter-appointed
judges, she found that a majority of women judges (62.9%) felt conflict
between their career and parenting roles, whereas a majority of men
(52.9%) rarely felt such a conflict. 9  Further, nearly two-thirds of the
female judges had primary responsibility for running their households.94
In describing their "major" problems in law, 81% of the women judges
surveyed answered by mentioning sex discrimination, whereas only
18.5% of their male counterparts referred to some racial or class-based
bias.95 This led Professor Martin to opine about the potential difference
that women might bring to the bench:
Their differences might influence such things as decisional output,
especially in cases involving sex discrimination; conduct of
courtroom business, especially as regards sexist behavior by
litigators; influence on sex-role attitudes held by their male
colleagues, especially on appellate courts where decisions are
collegial; administrative behavior, for example, in hiring women
law clerks and as noted in the introduction, collective actions,
through formal organizations, undertaken to heighten the judicial
9' See Eighth Circuit Task Force, supra note 75, at 93; see also Judith Resnick, Asking
About Gender in Courts, 21 SIGNS 952, 971 (1996) (citing studies showing that women judges
are treated with less respect and are thought of as less competent than their male
counterparts).
"' See Resnick, supra note 91, at 972.
9' See Martin, supra note 6, at 205.
See id. at 206. Only 14.3% of male judges ran their households. Id.
9 Id. at 207.
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system's response to gender bias problems in both law and
96process.
CONCLUSION
So, how can these studies be reconciled with notions of an impartial
judiciary? What does it mean for diversity on the bench in the twenty-
first century? First, the bad news. As a practical matter, presidents
likely are going to be reluctant to nominate nontraditional judges (in
spite of political pressure to do so) because of the increased time for
confirmation. The time delays in the confirmation process may make it
impossible in some cases for the sitting president to see that nomination
through by the end of his or her term in office. There is also increased
pressure to appoint conservative women and minority judges with more
traditional career tracks in order to avoid some of these problems in the
appointments process. This is unfortunate and will likely lessen the
potential for diversity to have an impact on the judicial system.
The potential for a diverse bench to have a positive impact on justice is
great. It should not be too worrisome that there is some tension between
the differences in perspective and, occasionally, outcome due to a more
diverse bench and the notion of a neutral judiciary. They are in fact
compatible. In the majority of cases - many of which are routine and
resolved by settlement - race and gender of the judge likely will not
affect outcomes. However, in cases that are policy-laden or difficult and
in which there is room for disagreement about outcome, the different
perspectives based on race or gender may affect decision making
patterns and outcomes. This is as it should be. Everyone is hemmed in,
to a certain extent, by life experiences - white males no less than
women or members of minority groups. That these views should find
expression in judicial decision making in controversial cases is natural.
What is of great concern is if only one viewpoint is expressed in these
cases and others are shut out. Judicial decision making in difficult cases
should be about a give and take between diverse perspectives and
viewpoints. Sometimes struggle and debate between various viewpoints
is the best way to reach the most just decision.
I Id. at 208.

